Abstract. Authentication and key agreement scheme is an important mechanism for legal users to access the services of wireless sensor network. However, the design of authentication and key agreement schemes in WSNs is still quite a challenging problem. In this paper, we analyze a strong authentication scheme with user privacy for WSNs proposed by Kumar et al. in 2013 , and point out the scheme can not resist known session key attack, impersonation attack, sensor node capture attack and suffer from forward security problem, anonymity and untraceability problem.
Introduction
Nowadays, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are the first choices for a wide range of real-time monitoring applications, such as health care, environmental monitoring, traffic monitoring, etc. In WSNs, data collected by sensor nodes sometimes contain valuable and confidential information that only authorized users are allowed to access. As yet, the design of user authentication and key agreement scheme for resource deficient wirless sensor networks has been substantially addressed by various researchers.
In 2007, Das [1] proposed a two-factor authentication scheme using smart card in which users are authenticated by gateway nodes. The scheme became a center of attraction for many researchers [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] working in this field. Das claimed his scheme to be free from the security problems such as stolen-verifier, many logged-in-users with the same identity, guessing, impersonation and replay attacks. In 2010, He et al. [2] pointed out that Das's scheme does not resist impersonation attack, privileged insider attack and lack of password update mechanism. During the same time, Khan and Alghathbar [3] showed that Das's scheme susceptible to gateway node bypassing attack and privileged insider attack and proposed an improved scheme. Later on, the improved scheme was pointed out that it does not realize mutual authentication and user's anonimity, and lacks a mechanism of establishing a session key. [7] Based on this, Yoo et al. proposed a new scheme in 2012. However, Kumar at al. [8] pointed out that Yoo et al.'s scheme does not resist impersonation attack and man-in-the-middle attack, and further proposed an improved scheme.
In this paper, we will point out that Kumar et al.'s scheme [8] does not resist known session key attack, impersonation attack, sensor node capture attack and suffer from forward security problem, anonymity and untraceability problem.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we briefly review Kumar et al.'s scheme. Section 3 points out the weaknesses of Kumar et al.'s scheme. Finally, we draw our conclusion in section 4.
The notations used throughout this paper are summarized in Table 1 . to the gate-way node(GW).
Step 2: Upon receiving the message, GW computes and , where the secret number J and X are respectively with a lifetime (such as one year).
Step 3: GW stores () h  and () hX into a smart card and issues this card to k U through an security channel.
Step 4: Upon receiving the card, k U stores the random number b into it such that the number need not be remembered.
Eventually, smart card has the following:
Authentication Phase In Kumar et al.'s scheme, authentication phase is further divided into two subphases: Login phase and verification phase. Login Phase: When the user k U wants to acquire relative data from some sensor node, he/she inserts his/her smart card into a card reader and then keys in his/her identity k ID and password k PW .
Step 1: The smart card computes , and then checks whether * B k and B k are equal. If they are not equal, terminate the scheme; otherwise, conduct the following steps.
Step 2: Generates a random number k C , computes a temporary key , and then use the temporary key to encrypt information , that is , where T' is user's current timestamp.
Step 3: The smart card sends the login message , , '  is an expected time interval for the message transmission delay.
Step 2: Decrypts k A with the GW's secret number J , and obtains ID ' k , id GW ' and ( )' hX .
Step 3: Computes , and then decrypts P k and obtains ( 
Step 4: Checks T'* ' T  . If they are not equal, terminates; otherwise, conducts the following steps.
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Step 5:
. If the three equations are all correct, the validity of user U k is verified by GW; otherwise, terminate the scheme.
Step 6: Computes , where T '' is the current timestamp. Then, GW sends message , '' k SID T  to the wireless sensor node Sn .
Step 7: Upon receiving the message , '' k SID T  , the sensor node checks the inequality
If yes, terminate the scheme; otherwise, conduct the following steps, where T''' is the current timestamp, T  is an expected time interval for the message transmission delay.
Step 
where T'''' is the current timestamp of the sensor node Sn .
Step 11: Computes , and then sends message
Step 12: Upon receiving the message  is an expected time interval for the message transmission delay.
Step 13: User . If the four equations are all correct, the validity of the sensor node Sn is verified by U k ; otherwise, terminate the scheme.
Weaknesses of Kumar et al.'s scheme
In this section, we will show that Kumar et al.'s scheme [8] does not implement forward security and user's untraceability, and is also vulnerable to known session key attack and node capture attack.  to GW . Then, the login request message will pass the verification from GW and Sn , and a session key will be agreed in the end, where T ''' a is the corresponded timestamp generated by the sensor node Sn . Forward security problem Forward security problem means that once attacker obtains a session key in some way, he/she will restore some previous session keys using the known session key and the information intercepted or eavesdropped from the public communicational channel. In this way, the attacker can easily decrypt the data transmitted in previous sessions.
Known session key attack
In Kumar Sensor node capture attack Generally, any identity authentication and session key agreement scheme for wireless sensor network would encounter sensor node capture attack. In this case, how to measure the degree of an authentication scheme's resistance to sensor node capture attack? That is, how to campare the security performance of different schemes in the sense of sensor node which may be captured.
In 2012, Ashok Kumar Das et al. [9] proposed a method of measuring. In the assumption that there are c nodes have been captured successfully, they define the ratio between the number of captured sessions and that of the total sessions as the toughness of an authentication scheme's resistance to sensor node capture attack. For a specific scheme, the value of toughness is between 0 and 1, and as small as possible. A scheme would be uncounditional security to resist sensor node capture attack if you could prove the value of toughness is 0. The basic idea of this method is quantitative analysis that the c caputured nodes effects on all other nodes in this wireless sensor network. Though the value of toughness in this definition would be very difficult to calculate in practice, it took the first step after all in the problem that how to measure the degree of an authentication scheme's resistance to sensor node capture attack. Through above analysis, it is easy to find that for Kumar et al.'s scheme, once one sensor node is captured, the data transferred between user and any other sensor node will be obtained since attacker would compute the session key. According to the definition of toughness in [9] , it is not difficult to know the value of toughness to resist to sensor node captured attack is 1. In other words, whole the sensor network would have no secure data communication as long as some sensor node has been captured. M which is difficult to compute. If we don't consider that attacker could be beyond the ability to control the communication channel, the analysis of Kumar et al. is correct. However, it is a common case in reality to capture sensor nodes or steal user's smart card and extract the information stored. According to the former analysis, it is not difficult to know that several methods can be used to obtain user's identity in this case.
Anonymity and untraceability problem
When it comes to user's untraceability, for Kumar et al.'s scheme [8] , even if the ability beyond that to control the communication channel is not took into consideration, an attacker can also easily judge whether two users are the same from the login request message eavesdropped. The reason is that the data 
Conclusions
In this paper, we analyze a strong authentication scheme with user privacy for WSNs proposed by Kumar et al. in 2013 , and point out the scheme can not resist known session key attack, impersonation attack, sensor node capture attack and suffer from forward security problem, anonymity and untraceability problem.
